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courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08MOSCOW2802, SECHIN AS ENERGY CZAR: MORE POWERFUL, MORE VULNERABLE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cable's unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#08MOSCOW2802**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08MOSCOW2802	2008-09-17 14:20	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Moscow

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2011/075/15.html>

VZCZCXRO4853
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #2802/01 2611420
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171420Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0027
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXL/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002802

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, FOR EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND WRIGHT EUR/CARC, SCA (GALLAGHER, SUMAR) DOE FOR FREDRIKSEN, HEGBORG, EKIMOFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2018
TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL PINR RS
SUBJECT: SECHIN AS ENERGY CZAR: MORE POWERFUL, MORE VULNERABLE

REF: A. MOSCOW 2759 B. MOSCOW 2183 C. MOSCOW 1385

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

SUMMARY

1. (C) In ref A, we examined questions about Deputy Prime Minister Sechin's career and reputation and discussed whether his current, more public role is SAINT OR SINNER
 2. (C) Igor Sechin has played an important role in shaping and carrying out GOR energy policies since the beginning of Prime Minister Putin's
 3. (C) Adding to this malevolent aura, most observers believe it was Sechin who engineered Yukos' demise, a signal turning point in Putin's
 4. (C) Where he has had a semi-public role, as Rosneft's chairman, other observers claim Sechin has performed more openly and more admirably.
- NEW POWERS
5. (C) As Deputy Premier in charge of energy and industrial policy and head of the government's energy policy commission, Sechin's powers over
 6. (C) His direct influence over the energy sector is not lost on industry players. Various contacts have told us they see Sechin, who continues to be
- MOTIVATED TO DELIVER REFORMS...
7. (C) That long-term strategy is both a challenge and an opportunity for Sechin. Excessive state control and interference have hobbled Russia's
 8. (C) To date, Sechin has been out in front on some needed energy sector reforms. He has pushed for lower oil sector taxes (ref C) and championed
 9. (C) The failure to reform the sector could expose Sechin to a level of public criticism from which he has been previously immune. The Carne
- OR TO STOP "THE GAZPROM STEAMROLLER"
10. (C) In assessing Sechin's potential as a reformer, many observers question his motives. They point especially to Sechin's long rivalry with
 11. (C) Many contacts with whom we spoke have noted Sechin's interest in containing Gazprom. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us he believes one of Sechin's
 12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX, however, told us he is convinced "one hundred percent that Sechin will lose this battle." Despite Oreshkin's suggestion
- COMMENT
13. (C) As is the case with his political role, the greater exposure that Sechin faces in his new duties may bring into greater focus his role as
- BEYRLE